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1. Introduction  
 
 One of the questions analyzed by the literature on mixed oligopoly is the decision by 
governments on whether to privatize their public firms. This analysis usually considers one 
country and one public firm (see, for example, De Fraja and Delbono, 1989, 1990; White, 
1996; Pal and White, 1998) and there is thus no strategic interaction between governments. 
To fill this gap in literature, we shall analyze whether public firms are privatized when there 
is strategic interaction between governments.  
 
 The literature on mixed oligopoly (see De Fraja and Delbono, 1989, 1990) shows that 
when the cost function is convex, the government privatizes the public firm if the number of 
private firms is high enough; when the number of private firms is low enough, the 
government always prefers the mixed oligopoly. On the other hand, Bárcena-Ruiz and 
Garzón (2001a) show that, when firms have a constant marginal cost of production and the 
public firm is less efficient than the private firms, the government privatizes the public firm if 
the inefficiency of that firm is high enough; this inefficiency depends on the marginal cost of 
the public firm, on the number of private firms and on market size.  
 
 The preceding analysis has been extended to study whether governments privatize their 
public firms when there is international trade. See, for example, Fjell and Pal (1996), White 
(1996) and Pal and White (1998). It must be noted that these authors consider only one 
public firm and assume that firms sell their product only in one country (that in which firms 
are located). Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2001b) assume a market comprising two countries 
and that there is only one public firm. They show that the decision by the government 
whether to privatize its public firm depends on the number of private firms located in each 
country; moreover, if both countries have the same number of private firms, the public firm 
will never be privatized. Although all these papers consider international trade in a 
framework of mixed oligopoly, they assume that there is only one public firm and, thus, 
there is no strategic interaction between governments when deciding whether to privatize 
their public firms. 
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 In this paper we consider a market comprising two countries, with free trade. In each 
country there are one public firm and n private firms. Firms have a constant marginal cost of 
production and the public firm is less efficient than the private firms. Each government has 
to decide whether to privatize its public firm. We obtain that the two governments privatize 
their public firms when the marginal cost of the public firms is high enough since, in this 
case, the producer surplus has a greater weight in social welfare than the consumer surplus. 
When the marginal cost of the public firms is low enough the result is reversed; i. e. neither 
government privatizes its public firm. Lastly, when the marginal cost of the public firms 
takes an intermediate value only one government privatizes its public firm, and that 
government obtains lower social welfare than the other. In this last case, for some 
configuration of the parameters of the model, the profit of the public firm is greater than the 
profit of each private firm.  
 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows the 
results and, conclusions are drawn in section 4.  
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a world market comprising two countries, A and B. In each country there 
are one public firm and n private firms producing a homogeneous good. The government of 
each country has to decide whether to privatize its public firm or not. If one government 
privatizes, in that country there are n+1 private firms.  
 
 The inverse demand function for the product in country k is:  
 
p = a – 2(qk0 –  ) q
n
i
ki ￿
=1
, k= A, B,  
 
where p is the price of the good in the world market, qk0 is the amount of the good 
produced by the public firm 0 in country k, and qki is the amount of the good produced by  
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private firm i in country k (k=A, B; i=1, …, n). Therefore, the world inverse demand 
function for the product is:  
 
p = a – qA0 – ￿
=
n
i
Ai q
1
 – qB0 – ￿
=
n
i
Bi q
1
. 
 
 We consider that there is free trade and, thus, consumers from both countries can buy 
the product independently of the location of the firms. The two countries have the same 
inverse demand function and, therefore, the consumer surplus in country k, denoted by CSk, 
is: 
 
 CSk= 
4
1
(qA0+￿
=
n
i
Ai q
1
+ qB0+￿
=
n
i
Bi q
1
)
2, k=A, B.        
 
 The private firms have a constant marginal cost of production which is normalized to 
zero. The public firm is less efficient than the private firms, so if it is privatized there is an 
improvement in efficiency.1 The marginal cost of production of the public firm is constant 
and equal to c, where 0< c < c* = a/(3+2n).2 
 
 The profit function of firm i, located in country k, is: 
 
pki = (a–qA0–￿
=
n
i
Ai q
1
–qB0–￿
=
n
i
Bi q
1
–ci)qki, i= 0, …, n; k=A, B; ci=0, "i„0; c0=c.   (1) 
 
                                                     
1 This assumption is usually employed in the mixed oligopoly literature to avoid a trivial solution. If the 
public firm is more or equally efficient than the private firms the public firm would produce a quantity such 
that the market price equals its marginal cost, resulting in a public monopoly (see Pal, 1998 and Estrin and 
de Meza, 1995). Empirical evidence shows both the superior efficiency of private firms relative to 
comparable public firms (Mueller, 1989; Vining and Boardman, 1992), and the improvement in efficiency 
after privatization (Kikery et al. 1992; Megginson et al. 1994). 
2 Without loss of generality, we assume that c<c* to avoid irrelevant cases.   
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 The social welfare function considered by government k comprises the consumer 
surplus in country k, CSk, and the producer surplus in country k, PSk. As usual, the producer 
surplus in country k is PSk =￿
=
p
n
i
ki
0
. Thus, the social welfare function considered by 
government k can be expressed as:  
 
Wk = CSk + PSk, k=A, B.                 (2) 
 
 The objective of this paper is to analyze whether the public firms are privatized when 
there is strategic interaction between governments. Therefore, we propose a two stage game 
with the following timing. In the first stage, each government decides, simultaneously, 
whether to privatize its public firm. In the second stage, each firm chooses its output level. 
We solve the game by backward induction from the last stage of the game to obtain a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
3. Results 
 
 In this section we shall analyze the decision by one government whether to privatize its 
public firm when the other government also has to decide whether to privatize its public 
firm. Given that there are two public firms that can be privatized, one in each country, there 
are four subgames in the first stage that, by symmetry, can be reduced to three. These three 
subgames are the following: neither of the governments privatizes its public firm (denoted 
by superscript NN), one government does not privatize while the other does (denoted by 
superscripts NP and PN, respectively), and the two governments privatize their public firms 
(denoted by superscript PP). 
 
3.1. Neither government privatizes its public firm 
 
 In the second stage of the game, private firm i located in country k chooses the output 
level, qki, that maximizes its profit function; the public firm 0 located in country k chooses  
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the output level, qk0, that maximizes the social welfare function of government k. Solving 
these problems simultaneously, we get the following result.  
 
Lemma 1. When there is one public firm in each country, in equilibrium, the output level of 
the firms, the consumer surplus, the profit of the firms, the producer surplus and social 
welfare in each country are, respectively: 
 
NN q0  = 
2
2 1 n)     c(   -   a +
, 
NN
i q = c, CS
NN = 
4
2 ) c a ( -
, 
NN
0 p  = 0, 
NN
i p = c2, PS
NN = n c2,  
W
NN = 
4
4
2 2 nc ) c a ( + -
, i=1, …, n. 
 
3.2. Only one government privatizes its public firm  
 
 In the second stage of the game, each private firm chooses the output level that 
maximizes its profit function; public firm 0 located in country k (k„h, k, h =A, B) chooses the 
output level, qk0, that maximizes the social welfare function of government k. Solving these 
problems simultaneously, we get the following result.  
 
Lemma 2. When there is only one public firm, in equilibrium, the output level of the firms, the 
consumer surplus, the profit of the firms, the producer surplus and social welfare in each 
country are, respectively: 
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n
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1 4 3
+
+
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i q = 
PN
j q =
n
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2
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2
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2
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n)-c) (a(
+
+
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2 3 1 4 3
n) (
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+
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+
+
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+
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, i=1, …, n; j=0, …, n. 
 
3.3. The two governments privatize their public firms 
 
 In the second stage of the game, private firm i located in country k chooses the output 
level, qki, that maximizes its profit function. Solving these problems simultaneously, we get 
the following result.  
 
Lemma 3. When the two governments privatize their public firms, in equilibrium, the output 
level of the firms, the consumer surplus, the profit of the firms and social welfare in each 
country are, respectively: 
 
 
PP
i q  = 
n
a
2 3+
, CS
PP = 
2
2 2
2 3
1
n) (
n) ( a
+
+
, 
PP
i p = 
2
2
2 3 n) (
a
+
, 
PP PS  = 
2
2
2 3
1
n) (
n) ( a
+
+
,  
 W
PP = 
2
2 2
2 3
3 2
n) (
) n n ( a
+
+ +
, i=0, …, n. 
 
 Once we have solved the different subgames, we have to solve stage one; i. e. we have to 
analyze whether each government privatizes its public firm. 
 
3.4. The decision by the governments whether to privatize their public firms  
 
 By using lemmas 1, 2 and 3 we obtain the following result, which is useful to study the 
decision by governments whether to privatize their public firms. 
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Lemma 4. In equilibrium:  
i) 
NN q0 >
NP q0 >
PP
j q >
NP
i q =
PN
j q >
NN
i q , i=1, …, n; j=0, …, n, 
ii) CS
NN > CS
NP = CS
PN > CS
PP,  
iii) max{PS
NP, PS
PP}>PS
PN>PS
NN,  
where PS
NP>PS
PP if and only if c<cPS, cPS=
) n n )( n (
) n n ) n ( n n ( a
2
2 2
2 6 3 2 3 8
36 84 57 2 5 12 44 39
+ + +
+ + + - + + , 
c*>cPS>0. 
 
 The results obtained in this lemma are similar to that obtained in the literature on mixed 
oligopoly (see De Fraja and Delbono, 1989, 1990, and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2001). 
But it must be noted that, in contrast to those papers, we consider two governments and 
two public firms instead of one government and one public firm; therefore, there is strategic 
interaction between governments when deciding whether to privatize their public firm.  
 
 By comparing the equilibrium output levels obtained in the three subgames, we get that 
NN q0 >
NP q0 >
PP
j q >
NP
i q =
PN
j q >
NN
i q . Given that public firms choose the output level that 
maximizes the social welfare function of their governments, they are more aggressive in the 
product market than private firms. As a result, a public firm produces a greater output level 
than a private firm and, the more public firms there are in the market the lower the output 
level of the private firms will be. On the other hand, the output level of a public firm is 
greater if there are two public firms in the market instead of one, since when there is 
international trade, public firms behave strategically. When one public firm is privatized, the 
other public firm reduces its output level since, in this way, the latter increases its profit and 
the profit of the n private firms in its country. Thus, the producer surplus of its country 
increases, which has a greater weight than the reduction in the consumer surplus of the 
country. 
 
 Given that public firms are more aggressive in the product market than private firms, the 
highest industry output level is obtained when there are two public firms in the market, and 
the lowest is obtained when there are none. Therefore, taking into account that the 
consumer surplus increases with industry output level, we get that: CS
NN>CS
NP=CS
PN>CS
PP.   
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 Lemma 4 shows that max{PS
NP, PS
PP}>PS
PN>PS
NN, and therefore the lowest producer 
surplus is obtained when there are two public firms in the market. The greatest producer 
surplus is not always obtained when all the firms are private; when the marginal cost of the 
public firm is low enough, c<c
PS, we obtain that PS
NP > PS
PP. 
 
 To explain the preceding result we must point out that 
NP
0 p >
NP
i p =
PN
j p  if and only if 
c<
p
1 c , and 
NP
0 p >
PP
i p  if and only if c<
p
2 c  (i=1,…, n; j=0,…, n), where; 
p
1 c =
) n (
a
+ 2 4
, 
p
2 c =
) n )( n (
) ) n )( n ( ) n ( ) n )( n (( a
2 3 1 8
18 19 2 3 2 5 10 13 2 3
+ +
+ + + - + +  and 0<c<
p
2 c <
p
1 c <c*. Therefore, when 
there is only one public firm in the market, the profit obtained by that firm is greater if its 
marginal cost of production is low enough (c<
p
2 c ), because if one public firm is privatized 
market competition decreases. The total output level of industry decreases, but the output 
level of each private firm increases while the output level of the public firm decreases, and 
the profit of the public and private firms increase. Thus, when there is only one public firm 
in the market, its profit is greater if its marginal cost of production is low enough and, as a 
result, we obtain that PS
NP is greater than PS
PP when c<cPS. 
 
 Next we shall solve the first stage of the game. From lemmas 1, 2 and 3 we obtain that 
W
NN>W
PN if and only if c<c1, and W
PP>W
NP if and only if c>c2, c* >c2>c1>cPS>0, where 
c1=
3 2
2 2
16 84 104 5
2 6 2 5 2 4 24 25
n n n
) n n n) ( n n ( a
+ + +
+ + + - + +  and c2=
) n n )( n (
) n n n) ( n n ( a
2
2 2
8 24 13 2 3 2
32 96 77 2 5 16 58 51
+ + +
+ + + - + + . 
It is easy then to obtain the following result. 
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Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the two governments privatize their public firms if c2£c<c*, 
only one government privatizes if c1£c<c2 and neither government privatizes if 0<c<c1.3 
 
 When the marginal cost of public firms is high enough (c2£c<c*), in equilibrium, both 
governments privatize. We have seen in lemma 4 that CS
NP is greater than CS
PP and that, in 
this zone, PS
PPis greater than PS
NP. Given that the marginal cost of the public firms is high 
enough, the producer surplus has a greater weight in social welfare than the consumer 
surplus. Thus, both governments privatize their public firms. 
 
 When the marginal cost of public firms is low enough (0<c< c1), in equilibrium, neither 
government privatizes. We have seen in lemma 3 that CS
NN is greater than CS
PN and that 
PS
PN is greater than PS
NN. In this case, as the marginal cost of the public firms is low enough, 
the consumer surplus has a greater weight in social welfare than the producer surplus. Thus, 
neither government privatizes its public firm. 
 
 When the marginal cost of public firms takes an intermediate value (c1£c<c2), in 
equilibrium, only one government privatizes its public firm. As we have seen in lemma 3, in 
this zone CS
NN > CS
NP = CS
PN > CS
PP and PS
NP > PS
PP > PS
PN > PS
NN. If one government 
privatizes, the other government does not privatize since CS
NP is greater than CS
PP and PS
NP 
is greater than PS
PP. If one government does not privatize its public firm, the other 
government does privatize since, although CS
NN is greater than CS
PN, PS
PN is greater than 
PS
NN and, thus, the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in 
social welfare.  
 
                                                     
3 If firms have a convex production cost function and public firms are more inefficient than private firms 
the main result of proposition 1 holds. For example, if we assume C(qki) = zqki
2/2, where z=1/3 if the firm is 
publicly owned and z=1/4 if the firm is privately owned, the following equilibrium is obtained: if n<2, 
neither government privatizes; if 2£n<17, only one government privatizes; lastly, if n‡17, both governments 
privatize. If public firms are equally efficient than private firms we obtain, assuming that z=1/4, that if n£5 
neither government privatizes; if n>5 only one government privatizes.  
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 It is easy to see that W
NP is greater than W
PN when c1 £ c < c2. Therefore, there is a 
prisoner’s dilemma since each government wants it to be the government of the other 
country which privatizes its public firm. Thus, if the game were sequential (i. e. one 
government decides whether to privatize before the other government does), the 
government deciding first would not privatize its public firm and the other government 
would privatize. Therefore, the government deciding first obtains greater social welfare than 
the other government, and the profit of its public firm is greater. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 The literature on mixed oligopoly has analyzed the decision by governments whether 
to privatize their public firms. This analysis usually considers one country and one public 
firm and, thus, there is no strategic interaction between governments. In this paper, we 
extend this analysis by assuming that there is strategic interaction between governments. We 
obtain that when the marginal cost of public firms is high enough the two governments 
privatize since, as the marginal cost of public firms is high enough, the producer surplus has 
a greater weight in social welfare than the consumer surplus. When the marginal cost of 
public firms is low enough, neither government privatizes. Lastly, when the marginal cost of 
public firms takes an intermediate value only one government privatizes, and that 
government obtains lower social welfare than the other.  
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